Many foreign countries have also clearly stated that they do not want this (E2EE) to happen and would legislate against it (the UK comes to mind first).
I do believe that you are correct with the idea that this technology was initially developed as a compromise to E2EE. But while E2EE on iCloud was indefinitely shelved, somehow this was not.
And someone at Apple thought this could be repurposed as a privacy win anyway ?
The other way I can think of it is if the ultimate goal is to add those checks to iMessage. One could argue the tech would make a lot more sense there (it's mostly E2EE with caveats), and it would certainly catch many more positive hashes.
I think someone at Apple massively misjudged the global implications of this and opened the company to a (literal) world of upcoming legislative hurt.
I read that article and see this new method as work around for the FBI complaints, and once again allowing E2EE to move forward.
Technology doesn't live in a vacuum. Given the calls from the government for backdoors to encryption, I think it's safe to assume this is Apple getting out in front of what could likely be heavy handed legislation to add actual backdoors like master keys.
But, we'll have to wait and see if Apple starts adding more services to E2EE again. It also may all be moot if legislation gets passed that forces companies to be able to break the encryption for warrants.
> Technology doesn't live in a vacuum. Given the calls from the government for backdoors to encryption, I think it's safe to assume this is Apple getting out in front of what could likely be heavy handed legislation to add actual backdoors like master keys.
I broadly agree but I cannot foresee a scenario where limiting at this particular issue (CSAM) would be seen as a sufficient compromise by legislators to allow E2EE to be expanded.
And other countries will have very different interpretations, much less palatable to Apple's values, on what should be checked for and they will have no qualm legislating to require it.
Quoting the NY Times (via Daring Fireball) :
> Mr. Neuenschwander dismissed those concerns, saying that safeguards are in place to prevent abuse of the system and that Apple would reject any such demands from a government.
> “We will inform them that we did not build the thing they’re thinking of,” he said.
They can tell themselves that but it doesn't matter : they precisely did.
Many foreign countries have also clearly stated that they do not want this (E2EE) to happen and would legislate against it (the UK comes to mind first).
I do believe that you are correct with the idea that this technology was initially developed as a compromise to E2EE. But while E2EE on iCloud was indefinitely shelved, somehow this was not.
And someone at Apple thought this could be repurposed as a privacy win anyway ?
The other way I can think of it is if the ultimate goal is to add those checks to iMessage. One could argue the tech would make a lot more sense there (it's mostly E2EE with caveats), and it would certainly catch many more positive hashes.
I think someone at Apple massively misjudged the global implications of this and opened the company to a (literal) world of upcoming legislative hurt.