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> the perps are dead, did not appear to be part of some organized group

A reasonable reason for inquiry here is to actually try to make sure if they were part of some organized group. "Appear not to be" is not quite enough.

This is a valid reason to investigate even if they are dead. How did they get radicalized, etc.

Not that it is a good enough reason to enforce breaking of encryption in the way proposed, but in a murder inquiry, privacy of the perps has to give way.



A reasonable reason for inquiry here is to actually try to make sure if they were part of some organized group. "Appear not to be" is not quite enough.

For a country that kills based on metadata[1], it seems quite far-fetched that they couldn't map out potentially interesting connections using just metadata.

Also, it would be pretty dumb to put any revealing data on a work phone with iCloud backups enabled (which is just not accessible due to the FBI's mistakes).

At any rate, this discussion is quite besides the point. Permitting this phone to be unlocked (or the hundred or so other phones mentioned) will open the floodgates for questionable regimes and a hunt for Apple's private key (more automation to handle requests will reduce security).

[1] http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2014/05/10/we-kill-people-based...


If this was really about the privacy of the perps; an NSL would've been enough and we'd never know about it. This is about setting precedent, and as publicly as possible.

If the feds get their way the entire idea of encryption is weakened, and not just for the lawful citizens. I suspect the reason for having this battle so publicly is propaganda based, just as it was with Zimmermann in the 90's.


Since you brought up NSL....

The legality of the NSL (which does not require oversight- the FBI can self-sign them) hinges on the idea that the persons on whom the information is being gathered have/had "no reasonable expectation" of privacy of the information.

That said, if these back doors were to be instituted, could the argument then be made that we now have "no reasonable expectation" of privacy of anything on our cell phones? Could this set a precedent of unholy proportions?


Absolutely, and as terrifying as that possibility is I personally think they didn't go the NSL route because Apple is big enough to finally prove or disprove the constitutionality of NSL's; even bring the process to mainstream attention. That's something the DOJ would never want to see happen, because then everyone can come out of the shadows and tell their story.


From other intel they know that he did not use his work phone much and saw no need to destroy it. He did destroy his private phone, so I think its quite clear that their is nothing on that phone.

I think its reasonable for the FBI to want to access it, but lets not have any illusions, the change that their is any evidence on the phone is basically 0%.


> "Appear not to be" is not quite enough.

It has to be, because there is no perfect. Everything is a numbers game between ever-more unlikely hypothetical evidence that might yield a valuable unknown, and the cost of collecting it.

By such completist thinking, we should examine every image and video in the world because they might show up in the background of a birthday party video or vacation selfie, giving us another clue. Similarly, we should interview everyone in cities they've been known to be in...

But in reality, unlike in a game or a movie, there is no 100% complete. The phone isn't one of a finite list of clues to examine whereby you will know everything you need to know. By fixating on the phone, or any few issues, you miss the larger point.

There's very little likelihood of learning anything of value here, and are far richer leads elsewhere.

This is just our security industry grandstanding for more money.


There is no perfect, but I think that by ordinary police standards in any developed country, not trying to investigate this kind of perp's phones would be too imperfect. It would be sloppy police work and any police officer deciding not to try to inspect the phone would be vulnerable to accusations of misconduct.

That doesn't mean that I agree that Apple should be forced to break the encryption. It means the police really have a duty to investigate.


I'm not saying they shouldn't be interested... What if, instead of simply being locked, the phone was eaten by a pelican that flew out over the ocean and died. Gone. Should we dredge the ocean to find the phone? It's a duty to do so, right?

The FBI have tried, and failed. How much more should they dredge before we stop harping on about this one piece of potential evidence?

In this case they have the phone physically in hand so they feel blocked and powerless, but from a cost-benefit point of view it might as well be at the bottom of the ocean.

Doesn't their duty compel them to investigate the most-likely to payout leads, not play political games over high-profile issues?


Alas, FBI's chances of breaking the encryption here (with support conscripted from Apple) are far higher than finding that pelican. By many orders of magnitude.


Their chance of beating a confession out of someone is pretty high too.

And when you consider the chance of there being worthwhile, actionable, data months later after their failures, finding the pelican is the safe part of the bet.


"Appear not to be" is often enough. The government is required to have probable cause to conduct a search.




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